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CharacterMoral psychology research has highlighted several factors critical for evaluating the morality of another’s
choice, including the detection of norm-violating outcomes, the extent to which an agent caused an out-
come, and the extent to which the agent intended good or bad consequences, as inferred from observing
their decisions. However, person-centered accounts of moral judgment suggest that a motivation to infer
the moral character of others can itself impact on an evaluation of their choices. Building on this person-
centered account, we examine whether inferences about agents’ moral character shape the sensitivity of
moral judgments to the consequences of agents’ choices, and agents’ role in the causation of those conse-
quences. Participants observed and judged sequences of decisions made by agents who were either bad
or good, where each decision entailed a trade-off between personal profit and pain for an anonymous vic-
tim. Across trials we manipulated the magnitude of profit and pain resulting from the agent’s decision
(consequences), and whether the outcome was caused via action or inaction (causation). Consistent with
previous findings, we found that moral judgments were sensitive to consequences and causation.
Furthermore, we show that the inferred character of an agent moderated the extent to which people were
sensitive to consequences in their moral judgments. Specifically, participants were more sensitive to the
magnitude of consequences in judgments of bad agents’ choices relative to good agents’ choices. We dis-
cuss and interpret these findings within a theoretical framework that views moral judgment as a dynamic
process at the intersection of attention and social cognition.
 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articleunder the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
A longstanding question in moral psychology is a concern with
the criteria people use when assigning blame to others’ actions.
Theories of blame highlight several critical factors in determining
an agent’s blameworthiness for a bad outcome (Alicke, Mandel,
Hilton, Gerstenberg, & Lagnado, 2015; Heider, 1958; Malle,
Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995). The first
step is detecting some bad outcome that violates a social norm.
Next comes an evaluation of whether the agent caused the out-
come, followed by an assessment of whether the agent intended
the outcome. People are considered more blameworthy for harm-
ful actions than equally harmful omissions (Baron, 1994; Baron &
Ritov, 1994; Cushman, Murray, Gordon-McKeon, Wharton, &Greene, 2012; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991) because the former
are viewed as more causal than the latter (Cushman & Young,
2011). Moreover, people are blamed more for intentional com-
pared to unintentional (i.e., accidental) harms (Karlovac & Darley,
1988; Shultz & Wright, 1985; Shultz, Wright, & Schleifer, 1986).
Causation and malintent are each alone sufficient to ascribe judg-
ments of blame for bad outcomes. In the case of accidental harms,
people blame agents for bad outcomes that they caused but did not
intend (Ahram et al., 2015; Cushman, 2008; Cushman, Dreber,
Wang, & Costa, 2009; Martin & Cushman, 2015; Oswald, Orth,
Aeberhard, & Schneider, 2005). There is also evidence that people
blame agents for bad outcomes that they intend or desire but do
not cause (Cushman, 2008; Inbar, Pizarro, & Cushman, 2012).
Other work has highlighted how inferences about moral charac-
ter impact the assignment of blame and praise. For example, judges
and juries frequently condemn repeat offenders to harsher penal-
ties than first-time offenders for equivalent crimes (Roberts,
1997), and conviction rates are correlated with jurors’ knowledgegnition
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ticularly when past crimes are similar to a current offence (Alicke
et al., 2015; Wissler & Saks, 1985). In the laboratory, people assign
more blame to dislikable agents than likable agents (Alicke & Zell,
2009; Kliemann, Young, Scholz, & Saxe, 2008; Nadler, 2012). These
observations are consistent with a person-centered approach to
moral judgment, which posits that evaluations of a person’s moral
character bleed into evaluations of that person’s actions (Uhlmann,
Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). In other words, despite being
instructed to assess whether an act is blameworthy, people may
instead evaluate whether the person is blameworthy.
In line with this view, there is evidence that evaluations of cau-
sation and intent are themselves sensitive to inferences about an
agent’s character (Alicke, 1992; Alicke, 2000; Knobe, 2010; Knobe
& Fraser, 2008; Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 2004). That is, people
tend to conflate moral evaluations of agents with their perceptions
of agents’ intentions and causation. For example, in the culpable
control model of blame, a desire to assign blame to disliked agents
influences perceptions of their control over an accident (Alicke,
2000; but see Malle et al., 2014). In an early demonstration of this
phenomenon, participants were told that a man speeding home got
into a car accident, leaving another person severely injured (Alicke,
1992). The man was described as rushing home to hide either an
anniversary present or a vial of cocaine from his parents. Partici-
pants judged the delinquent cocaine-hiding individual as having
more control by comparison to the virtuous present-hiding man.
Similar effects are seen when participants are given more general
information about the agent’s character (Alicke & Zell, 2009;
Nadler, 2012). People also judge an agent who breaks a rule as
being more causally responsible for an outcome that breaks a rule
than an agent who takes the same action but does not break a rule,
suggesting negative moral evaluations increase causal attributions
(Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009).
Moral judgments of agents also affect evaluations of intent. For
instance, harmful foreseen side-effects are seen as more inten-
tional than helpful foreseen side effects, suggesting that negative
moral evaluations lower the threshold for inferring intentionality
(Alicke, 2008; Knobe, 2010; Knobe & Fraser, 2008; Nadelhoffer,
2004; Ngo et al., 2015; Uhlmann et al., 2015). In a study where par-
ticipants played an economic game with agents who were either
trustworthy or untrustworthy, and then evaluated the extent to
which the agents intended various positive and negative outcomes,
the untrustworthy agent was more likely to be evaluated as
intending negative outcomes than the trustworthy agent
(Kliemann et al., 2008). Greater activation was seen in the right
temporoparietal junction, a region implicated in evaluating intent,
when assigning blame to an untrustworthy relative to a trustwor-
thy agent (Kliemann et al., 2008). Thus there is a substantial liter-
ature supporting a ‘person-as-moralist’ view of blame attribution
(Alicke et al., 2015; Knobe, 2010; Tetlock, 2002), which posits that
people are fundamentally motivated to assess the goodness and
badness of others, and perceive others’ intent and causation in a
way that is consistent with their moral evaluations.
To assign blame and praise it is necessary to infer an agent’s
mental state based on their actions, by considering the likely end
consequences of their action (Malle, 2011). Recent work has shown
that from an early age people readily infer people’s intentions by
observing their decisions, deploying a ‘‘naïve utility calculus” that
assumes people’s choices are aimed at maximizing desirable con-
sequences and minimizing undesirable consequences, where desir-
ability is evaluated with respect to the agent’s preferences (Jara-
Ettinger, Gweon, Schulz, & Tenenbaum, 2016). This means that
in situations where agents make deterministic choices, their inten-
tions can be inferred from the consequences of their choices. Eval-
uations of moral character are intimately linked to inferences
about intentions, where accumulated evidence of bad intent leadsPlease cite this article in press as: Siegel, J. Z., et al. Inferences about moral char
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Cohen, 2006; Uhlmann et al., 2015). What remains unknown is
whether, and how, the formation of character beliefs impacts on
moral judgments of individual actions. In other words, when peo-
ple repeatedly observe an agent bring about either harmful or
helpful consequences, do learnt inferences about the agent’s char-
acter influence how people make judgments regarding the agent’s
individual acts?
Our research addresses several open questions. First, although
studies have shown that perceptions of character influence sepa-
rate assessments of consequences, causation, and blameworthi-
ness, it remains unknown how precisely character evaluations
affect the degree to which consequences and causation shape blame
attributions (Fig. 1). Second, the bulk of research in this area has
focused on judgments of blameworthiness for harmful actions
with less attention to how people judge praiseworthiness for help-
ful actions (Cushman et al., 2009; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey,
2003; Weiner, 1995). Furthermore, those studies that have investi-
gated praiseworthy actions have generally used scenarios that dif-
fer from those used in studies of blame not only in terms of their
moral status but also in terms of their typicality. For example,
studies of blame typically assess violent and/or criminal acts such
as assault, theft, and murder, while studies of praise typically
assess good deeds such as donating to charity, giving away posses-
sions or helping others with daily tasks (Eisenberg, Zhou, & Koller,
2001; Pizarro et al., 2003). Thus, our understanding of how conse-
quences and causation impact judgments of blame versus praise,
and their potential moderation by character assessments, is limited
by the fact that previous studies of blame and praise are not easily
comparable.
In the current study we used a novel task to explore how infer-
ences about moral character influence the impact of consequences
and causation on judgments of blame and praise for harmful and
helpful actions. Participants evaluated the blameworthiness or
praiseworthiness of several agents’ harmful or helpful actions.
These varied across trials, in terms of their consequences and also
in terms of the degree to which the actions caused a better or worse
outcome for a victim. In Study 1, participants evaluated a total of
four agents: two with good character, and two with bad character.
In Study 2 we replicate the effects of Study 1 in a truncated task
where participants evaluated one agent with good character and
one agent with bad character. We used linear mixed models to
assess the extent to which blame and praise judgments were sen-
sitive to the agents’ consequences, the agents’ causation of the out-
comes, the agents’ character, and the interactions among these
factors. The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to cap-
ture the influence of consequences, causation, and character on
integrated moral judgments, without requiring participants to
directly report their explicit (i.e., self-reported) evaluations of
these cognitive subcomponents (Crockett, 2016) (Fig. 1). For exam-
ple, we can measure whether the effects of perceived causation on
blame differs for good and bad agents, without asking participants
directly about the perceived causation of good vs. bad agents. With
this approach we can more closely approximate the way assess-
ments of consequences and causation influence blame judgments
in everyday life, where people might assign blame using implicit,
rather than explicit, evaluations of causation and consequences.
We manipulated the agents’ consequences by having the agents
choose, on each trial, between a harmful option that yields a higher
monetary reward at the expense of delivering a larger number of
painful electric shocks to an anonymous victim, and a helpful option
that yields a lower monetary reward but results in fewer painful
shocks delivered to the victim (Fig. 2A). Across trials we varied
the amount of profit and pain that result from the harmful relative
to the helpful option. Thus, an agent in choosing the harmful
option might inflict a small or large amount of pain on the victimacter moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise. Cognition
Fig. 1. Previous work has investigated the effects of character perception on separate explicit (i.e., self-reported) judgments of consequences, causation, and blame. In the
current study we investigate how character perception moderates the impact of consequences and causation on blame judgments. Consequences and causation were
manipulated within the task structure.
Fig. 2. Trial structure for the moral judgment task. (A) Each trial consisted of three screens that began by indicating a default number of shocks and money an agent would
receive if that agent did nothing (above). This was followed by an alternative number of shocks and money that the agent would receive if they decided to switch (below).
Finally, the agent’s choice was revealed and participants judged each choice on a scale ranging from ‘blameworthy’ to ‘praiseworthy’. (B) Heat maps depicting the bad and
good agents’ probability of choosing the more harmful option as a function of the money gained and shocks delivered. As the option becomes more profitable (i.e., as more
money is offered at the cost of each shock), the probability of choosing the harmful option increases, but the bad agents require less profit to choose the harmful option than
do the good agents.
J.Z. Siegel et al. / Cognition xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 3for a small or large profit. Likewise, for helpful actions, an agent
might sacrifice a small or large amount of money to reduce the vic-
tim’s pain by a small or large amount. We predicted that partici-
pants would infer the agents’ intentions from their choices and
assign blame and praise accordingly: an agent who is willing toPlease cite this article in press as: Siegel, J. Z., et al. Inferences about moral char
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.004inflict a given amount of pain for a small profit should be blamed
more than an agent who is only willing to inflict the same amount
of pain for a much larger profit. Likewise, an agent who is willing to
sacrifice a large amount of money to reduce pain by a given
amount should be evaluated as more praiseworthy than an agentacter moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise. Cognition
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benefit. Such evaluations would be consistent with the idea that
people infer the intentions of others according to a ‘‘naïve utility
calculus” where agents choose so as to minimize costs and maxi-
mize rewards (Jara-Ettinger et al., 2016).
We manipulated causation by having the agents cause the
harmful and helpful outcomes either via an overt action, or via
inaction. Previous work has shown that the well-documented
‘omission bias’, whereby harm brought about by an action is
judged worse than harm brought about by a failure to act (Baron
& Ritov, 1994; Kordes-de Vaal, 1996; Spranca et al., 1991), can be
explained primarily by causal attribution (Cushman & Young,
2011). That is, an agent who brings about harm via an action is
seen as causing the harm more than an agent who brings about
harm by failing to act. At the start of each trial, a default option
was highlighted and the agent could switch from the default to
the alternative by pressing a key within a time limit. On half the
trials the agent switched, while on the other half the agent did
nothing. Crucially, across trials we matched the amount of help
and harm that resulted from switching versus doing nothing, so
that the agents brought about identical outcomes both via action
and inaction. We predicted that participants would assign more
blame for the same harmful outcomes brought about via action
than inaction, and that they would assign more praise for the same
helpful outcomes brought about via action than inaction, consis-
tent with previous studies (Baron, 1994; Baron & Ritov, 1994;
Cushman et al., 2012; Johnson & Drobny, 1987; Spranca et al.,
1991).
Finally, we manipulated character by having agents choose
according to different exchange rates for money and pain: good
agents required a high profit to inflict pain on others (£2.43 per
shock), and were willing to sacrifice large amounts of money to
reduce a victim’s pain; bad agents required only a small profit to
inflict pain (£0.40 per shock) and were only willing to sacrifice
small amounts of money to reduce a victim’s pain (Fig. 2B). Previ-
ous studies investigating how people actually make choices in this
setting demonstrated the amount of money people are willing to
trade for others’ pain correlates with morally relevant traits,
including empathy and psychopathy (Crockett, Kurth-Nelson,
Siegel, Dayan, & Dolan, 2014). Although good and bad agents by
definition made different choices, on a subset of trials they made
the same choice. Consistent with studies showing people assign
more blame to disliked individuals (Alicke & Zell, 2009;
Kliemann et al., 2008; Nadler, 2012), we predicted that bad agents
would be blamed more than good agents, even when making iden-
tical choices.2. Methods
2.1. General procedure
Two studies were conducted at the Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging in London, UK and were approved by University Col-
lege London (UCL) Research Ethics Committee (4418/001). Partici-
pants in both studies completed a battery of trait questionnaires
online prior to attending a single testing session. Each session
included two participants who were led to separate testing rooms
without seeing one another to ensure complete anonymity. After
providing informed consent, a titration procedure was used to
familiarize participants with the electric shock stimuli that would
be used in the experiment. Subjects were then randomly assigned
to one of two roles: the ‘decider’ who engaged in a moral decision
task, or the ‘receiver’ who completed a moral judgment task. In
Study 1, participants assigned to the role of the receiver completed
the moral judgment task. In Study 2, participants assigned to thePlease cite this article in press as: Siegel, J. Z., et al. Inferences about moral char
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with the receivers from Study 1) completed the moral judgment
task after completing the moral decision task. Here, we focus on
behavior in the moral judgment task alone. Data from the moral
decision task in Study 2 is reported elsewhere (Crockett et al.,
2014).2.2. Participants
Healthy volunteers (Study 1: N = 40, 16 men; Study 2, N = 40, 14
men) were recruited from the UCL psychology department and the
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience participant pools. All partici-
pants provided written informed consent prior to participation
and were financially compensated for their time. Participants with
a history of systemic or neurological disorders, psychiatric disor-
ders, medication/drug use, pregnant women, and more than two
years’ study of psychology were excluded from participation. Fur-
thermore, to minimize variability in participants’ experiences with
the experimental stimuli, we excluded participants previously
enrolled in studies involving electric shocks. Power calculations
indicated that to detect effects of moderate size (d = 0.5) with
80% power, we required a sample of at least 34 participants. The
current samples were thus adequately powered to detect moderate
effects of our experimental manipulations.2.3. Experimental design
As previously stated, participants entered the laboratory in
pairs and were then randomized into the role of either ‘decider’
or ‘receiver’. Both participants were then informed of the decider’s
task (the moral decision task), which involved choosing between
delivering more painful electric shocks for a larger profit, and
delivering fewer shocks but for a smaller profit. For each trial of
the moral decision task, there was a default option and an alterna-
tive. The default option would automatically be implemented if the
decider did nothing, but deciders could switch from the default to
the alternative by making an active response. The decider alone
received money from their decisions, but shocks were sometimes
allocated to the decider and sometimes allocated to the receiver.
Participants were informed that at the end of the decider’s task,
one of the decider’s choices would be randomly selected and
implemented. Thus, participants assigned to the role of the recei-
ver (participants in Study 1) were aware that they could receive
harmful outcomes (electric shocks) resulting from the decisions
of another person. Conversely, participants assigned to the role of
the decider (participants in Study 2) were aware that their deci-
sions could result in a degree of harm to another person.
In Study 1, participants completed a moral judgment task in
which they evaluated sequences of 30–32 choices made by four fic-
tional deciders (here, called ‘‘agents”), presented one at a time in
random order, for a total of 124 trials. After observing a given
choice, participants provided a moral judgment of the choice on
a continuous visual analogue scale ranging from 0 (blameworthy)
to 1 (praiseworthy) (Fig. 2A). In Study 2, participants completed a
similar task where they evaluated sequences of 30 choices made
by two agents, presented one at a time in random order, for a total
of 60 trials. Participants in Study 1 were instructed that the agents
whose choices they were evaluating reflected the choices of previ-
ous deciders and were not the choices of the current decider in the
next room. Participants in Study 2 were instructed that the agents
whose choices they were evaluating reflected the choices of previ-
ous deciders. For full instructions and trial parameters, see Supple-
mentary Materials).
Across trials for a given agent we manipulated the following
factors:acter moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise. Cognition
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amount of money that resulted from the agent’s choice. These
numbers could be negative (helpful, costly choices for the
agent) or positive (harmful, profitable choices for the agent).
The difference in number of shocks ranged from 9 to 9, while
the difference in amount of money ranged from -£9.90 to £9.90.
Thus, in Fig. 2a, the difference in shocks was equal to 1 shock
and the difference in money was equal to £5.00. The precise
amounts of shocks and money resulting from harmful and help-
ful choices were sufficiently de-correlated across trials (correla-
tion coefficients <0.7, Dormann et al., 2013; Supplementary
Table 1) enabling us to examine independent effects of shocks
and money on judgments in our regression analysis. Addition-
ally, this manipulation enabled a parametric analysis examining
harmfulness and profit on a continuous scale.
 Causation: on half the trials, agents chose to switch from the
default to the alternative option (action trials). On the other
half, agents chose to stick with the default option (inaction tri-
als). Action and inaction trials were matched in terms of conse-
quences so we could directly compare judgments of harmful
actions with equally harmful inactions, and helpful actions with
equally helpful inactions. Because actions are perceived as more
causal than inactions (Cushman & Young, 2011), this manipula-
tion enabled us to investigate the extent to which moral judg-
ments are sensitive to differences in the agents’ causal role for
bringing about the outcome. Across trials, the default number
of shocks varied from 1 to 20, while the default amount of
money was always £10.00.
 Character: To investigate how character influences judgments
we manipulated the moral preferences of the agents. Specifi-
cally, each agent’s moral preferences were determined by a
computational model of moral decision-making validated in
previous experiments (Crockett et al., 2014; Crockett et al.,
2015, Fig. 2B). In this model, the subjective cost of harming
another is quantified by a harm aversion parameter, j. When
ln(j)? 1, agents are minimally harm-averse and will accept
any number of shocks to increase their profits; as ln(j)?1,
agents become increasingly harm-averse and will pay increas-
ing amounts of money to avoid a single shock.
Participants in Study 1 judged the choices of four agents: two
bad agents (agents B1 and B2; ln(j) = 2.) and two good agents
(agents G1 and G2; ln(j) = 0). The agents’ choices were determined
by a computational model that described the value of switching
from the default to the alternative (Vact) as a function of the differ-
ence in money, Dm, and difference in shocks, Ds, scaled by j for
agent i:
Vact ¼ Dm Ds  elnðjiÞ ð1Þ
Agents B1 and G1 faced identical choice sets but made different
proportions of harmful vs. helpful choices, with agent B1 harming
on 66% of trials and agent G1 harming on 33% of trials. These two
agents made identical choices 66% of the time, which allowed us
to compare subjects’ judgments on trials where the bad and good
agent made identical choices. Agents B2 and G2 faced choice sets
with different incentives that induced each to choose the more
harmful option on 50% of trials. This permitted us to compare sub-
jects’ judgments of choices resulting in equivalent shocks, but for
different amounts of money; the good agent required a greater
profit for equivalent increases in shocks, and would accept greater
losses for equivalent decreases in shocks, relative to the bad agent.
Participants in Study 2 only evaluated the choices of agents B1
and G1 after completing the moral decision task. This allowed us to
focus our analysis on choices where agents faced identical choice
sets and behaved similarly most of the time. In both studies, threePlease cite this article in press as: Siegel, J. Z., et al. Inferences about moral char
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pants. See Supplemental Materials for details about agent
simulations.
Also in both studies, after observing the full sequence of choices
for each agent, participants rated two aspects of the agent’s charac-
ter (kindness and trustworthiness) and three aspects of the agent’s
choices (harmfulness, helpfulness, selfishness). Each rating was
provided on a continuous visual analogue scale ranging from 0
(not at all) to 1 (extremely). The exact wordings of the questions
were as follows:
Kindness: ‘‘In your opinion, how KIND was this Decider?”
Trustworthiness: ‘‘How much would you TRUST this Decider?”
Harmfulness: ‘‘Please consider all of the Decider’s choices. In
your opinion, what proportion of the Decider’s choices were
HARMFUL?”
Helpfulness: ‘‘Please consider all of the Decider’s choices. In your
opinion, what proportion of the Decider’s choices were HELP-
FUL?”
Selfishness: ‘‘Please consider all of the Decider’s choices. In your
opinion, how SELFISH was this Decider?”
2.4. Analysis
We analysed the data using a number of complementary
approaches. In a regression analysis we modelled participants’
trial-by-trial moral judgments of all agents in a linear mixed-
effects model with random intercepts and slopes. The regressors
in the model included: moral character (‘character’, b1), the abso-
lute difference between the chosen and unchosen amounts of
shocks (‘shocks’, b2), the absolute difference between the chosen
and unchosen amounts of money (‘money’, b3), causation of conse-
quences (dummy coding for action vs. inaction, b4), the interaction
between character and shocks (b5), the interaction between char-
acter and money (b6), and the interaction between character and
causation (b7). Character was operationalized as a categorical
regressor describing the effect of good agents on moral judgments.
Our regression included an intercept term, c, capturing the average
judgment across trials, and all other coefficients expressed mean
deviations from this judgment.
Judgment ¼ b1 jð Þ þ b2 Dsð Þ þ b3 Dmð Þ þ b4 causationð Þ
þ b5 Ds  jð Þ þ b6 Dm  jð Þ þ b7 causation  jð Þ þ c ð2Þ
We focused on the absolute magnitude of each weight, rather than
its directionality, because this provided us with estimates of how
sensitive people were to the different features of the choice. In ana-
lysing the independent effects of character, consequences, and cau-
sation, we aimed to validate our approach by replicating findings
previously reported using scenario-based methods, such as
increased blame for more harmful consequences, and increased
blame for harmful actions relative to inactions. Subsequent analyses
of the interaction terms allowed us to investigate the effects of
moral character on sensitivity to each main effect.
Our primary analysis used a categorical character regressor in
the model. However, to verify our results we also fit the model
described in Eq. (2) substituting the categorical ‘character’ regres-
sor with participants’ own subjective ratings of the agents’ kind-
ness. We chose to focus specifically on the kindness character
rating because our task was not designed to measure trust.
We fit the data using a linear mixed-effects model with random
intercepts in R (lmerTest package). Estimates of fixed effects are
reported along with standard error (SE, M = mean ± SE).
In a subsequent exploratory analysis, we examined the inde-
pendent influence of moral character on: (a) how sensitive people
were to consequences in attributions of blame, and (b) how sensi-acter moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise. Cognition
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end, we fit each parameter in our linear model separately for harm-
ful trials (where the agent chose the option with more shocks) and
helpful trials (where the agent chose the option with fewer
shocks). Because we did not find a significant interaction between
character and causation in our previous analysis, we omitted these
regressors from the model.
Judgment ¼ b1 jð Þ þ b2 Dsð Þ þ b3 Dmð Þ þ b4 causationð Þ þ b5 Ds  jð Þ
þ b6 Dm  jð Þ þ c
b2;b3;b4;b5;b6 ¼
b2þ;b3þ; b4þ;b5þ;b6þ if help trial
b2;b3; b4;b5;b6 if harm trial

ð3Þ
We modelled participants’ moral judgments of all agents using the
same linear mixed effects procedure in R.
Where possible, we confirmed the findings of our linear mixed-
effects models with analyses that did not rely on a model. To do
this we computed mean judgments for each cell of our 2 (harmful
vs. helpful)  2 (action vs. inaction)  2 (good vs. bad agent) design
on the subset of trials where good and bad agents made identical
choices (Supplementary Table S2). We entered these mean judg-
ments to a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) and
compared the results of this analysis to the results from our model.3. Results
3.1. Manipulation checks
Participants’ post hoc ratings of the agents suggested they accu-
rately inferred the agents’ moral character from the choices they
made. Relative to bad agents, participants rated good agents’ char-
acter as significantly more kind (Study 1, Bad: M = 0.331 ± 0.024;
Good = 0.732 ± 0.020; t = 14.326, p < 0.001; Study 2, Bad:
M = 0.453 ± 0.032; Good = 0.749 ± 0.024; t = 9.072, p < 0.001)
and trustworthy (Study 1, Bad: M = 0.322 ± 0.023;
Good = 0.686 ± 0.023; t = 11.655, p < 0.001; Study 2, Bad:
M = 0.463 ± 0.034; Good = 0.735 ± 0.030; t = 8.045, p < 0.001).
Participants also rated good agents’ choices as more helpful (Study
1, Bad: M = 0.406 ± 0.025; Good = 0.687 ± 0.022; t = 9.613
p < 0.001; Study 2, Bad: M = 0.435 ± 0.032; Good = 0.722 ± 0.029;
t = 10.597, p < 0.001), less harmful (Study 1, Bad: M = 0.641
± 0.022; Good = 0.325 ± 0.025; t = 10.663, p < 0.001; Study 2, Bad:
M = 0.606 ± 0.037; Good = 0.382 ± 0.041; t = 6.542, p < 0.001) and
less selfish (Study 1, Bad:M = 0.657 ± 0.026; Good = 0.328 ± 0.025;
t = 9.375, p < 0.001; Study 2, Bad: M = 0.635 ± 0.028;
Good = 0.353 ± 0.032; t = 8.568, p < 0.001) than bad agents’ choices.
Next we asked whether our within-task manipulations of con-
sequences and causation exerted significant effects on moral judg-
ments. To do this, we computed across all agents and trials the
average judgments for each cell of our 2 (harmful vs. helpful)  2
(action vs. inaction)  2 (good vs. bad agent) design and subjected
these mean judgments to a repeated-measures ANOVA. As
expected, there was a significant effect of consequences on moral
judgments [Study 1: F(1, 39) = 551.879, p < 0.001; Study 2: F(1,
39) = 70.385, p < 0.001], indicating that harmful choices were
judged more blameworthy than helpful choices. As can be seen
in Fig. 3a-b, judgments of helpful choices were above the midpoint
of the scale and harmful choices were below the midpoint of the
scale. This suggests that participants did in fact believe that helpful
actions were deserving of praise, despite the fact that all helpful
choices resulted in some degree of harm.
The main effect of causation was significant in Study 1 [F(1, 39)
= 4.651, p = 0.037], though not in Study 2 [F(1, 39) = 0.040,
p = 0.843], indicating actions were judged as more praiseworthyPlease cite this article in press as: Siegel, J. Z., et al. Inferences about moral char
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.004than inactions for Study 1 alone. This was qualified by a statisti-
cally significant interaction between causation and consequences
on moral judgments in both studies [Study 1, F(1, 39) = 73.068,
p < 0.001; Study 2, F(1, 39) = 22.121, p < 0.001; Fig. 3a and b]. Sim-
ple effects analyses showed that participants judged harmful
actions as more blameworthy than harmful inactions (Study 1,
t = 5.589, p < 0.001; Study 2, t = 3.222, p = 0.003), and helpful
actions as more praiseworthy than helpful inactions (Study 1,
t = 7.479, p < 0.001; Study 2, t = 2.869, p = 0.007). This analysis ver-
ified that within our design, moral judgments were strongly influ-
enced both by the consequences of actions and by the causal role
the agents played in producing the consequences.
3.2. Main effects of character on moral judgment
Next we examined the estimates from ourmodel (Eq. (2)), which
showed that controlling for all other factors, there was a small but
significant effect of moral character on judgment. As predicted, bad
agents were ascribed more blame than good agents (Study 1,
b1 = 0.077 ± 0.006, t = 12.112, p < 0.001; Study 2, b1 =
0.093 ± 0.016, t = 5.658, p < 0.001). We repeated our analysis sub-
stituting the categorical ‘character’ regressor with participants’
own subjective ratings of the agents’ kindness and obtained the
same results (Study 1, b1 = 0.178 ± 0.012, t = 15.330, p < 0.001;
Study 2, b1 = 0.161 ± 0.031 t = 5.234, p < 0.001; See Supplementary
Materials for full model results). Our model results were consistent
with a complementary analysis in which we computed mean judg-
ments for each cell of our 2 (harmful vs. helpful)  2 (action vs.
inaction)  2 (good vs. bad agent) design on the subset of trials
where good and bad agents made identical choices. Here, we
observed a trend towards more favourable judgments of good than
bad agents in Study 1 [F(1, 39) = 3.314, p = 0.076], and significantly
more favourable judgments of good than bad agents in Study 2
[F(1, 39) = 5.774, p = 0.021]. Thus, for the exact same choices, bad
agents received slightly harsher judgments than good agents, Fig. 4.
3.3. Character moderates the effects of consequences on moral
judgments
Parameter estimates for shocks, money, and causation in Eq. (2)
were all significantly different from 0, indicating that moral judg-
ments were independently affected by the number of shocks deliv-
ered to the victim (Study 1, b2 = 0.016 ± 0.001, t = 13.240,
p < 0.001; Study 2, b2 = 0.019 ± 0.002, t = 8.815, p < 0.001), the
amount of money received by the agent (Study 1,
b3 = 0.028 ± 0.001, t = 23.707, p < 0.001; Study 2,
b3 = 0.023 ± 0.002, t = 12.333, p < 0.001), and whether the agent
made an active or passive choice (Study 1, b4 = 0.127 ± 0.007,
t = 17.708, p < 0.001; Study 2, b4 = 0.097 ± 0.013, t = 7.373,
p < 0.001). Furthermore, moral character moderated participants’
sensitivity to consequences. The interaction between character
and shocks was significantly negative in both studies (Study 1,
b5 = 0.004 ± 0.002, t = 2.535, p = 0.011; Study 2,
b5 = 0.010 ± 0.003, t = 3.166, p = 0.002). The interaction
between character and money was also significantly negative in
both studies (Study 1, b6 = 0.010 ± 0.002, t = 6.787, p < 0.001;
Study 2, b6 = 0.015 ± 0.004, t = 4.214, p < 0.001). Negative
parameter estimates indicate that judgments of bad agents’
choices were significantly more sensitive to consequences than
judgments of good agents’ choices. Meanwhile judgments of bad
and good agents’ choices did not differ in terms of their sensitivity
to causation (Study 1, b7 = 0.002 ± 0.010, t = 0.177, p = 0.860; Study
2, b7 = 0.0.008 ± 0.018, t = 0.446, p = 0.656). To illustrate these
interaction effects, we estimated the shocks, money and causation
parameters separately for the good and bad agents and display
these in Fig. 5a–c.acter moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise. Cognition
Fig. 3. Causation moderates moral judgments of harmful and helpful behavior. Across all agents, harmful actions were more blameworthy than harmful inactions, and helpful
actions were more praiseworthy than helpful inactions. Y-axis, represents the mean judgment (from 0 = blameworthy to 1 = praiseworthy) subtracted by the midpoint of the
scale (0.5 = neutral). Error bars represent standard error of the difference between means.
Fig. 4. Overall effect of character on moral judgment. Across trials where good and bad agents behave identically, bad agents’ choices are evaluated more harshly than good
agents’ choices. Error bars represent standard error of the difference between means. *P < 0.05; n.s.t. = non-significant trend.
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In an exploratory analysis we modelled the effects of character,
consequences, and their interaction on moral judgments separately
for trials where agents harmed vs. helped (Eq. (3)). Here we
observed an effect of harm magnitude on judgments of harmful
choices: increases in the number of shocks amplified ascriptions
of blame for harmful choices (Study 1, b2 = 0.031 ± 0.001,
t = 21.846, p < 0.001; Study 2, b2 = 0.029 ± 0.002, t = 12.043,
p < 0.001), and decreases in the number of shocks amplified ascrip-
tions of praise for helpful choices (Study 1, b2+ = 0.027 ± 0.002,
t = 17.482, p < 0.001; Study 2, b2+= 0.034 ± 0.003, t = 10.384,
p < 0.001). Money also exerted an independent effect on judg-
ments. Across both studies, harmful choices were less blamewor-
thy when accompanied by larger profits (Study 1,
b3 = 0.023 ± 0.001, t = 19.850, p < 0.001; Study 2,
b3 = 0.019 ± 0.002, t = 10.608, p < 0.001). Meanwhile, helpful
choices were less praiseworthy when they were accompanied by
smaller relative to larger costs in Study 1 (b3+ = 0.055 ± 0.016,
t = 3.335, p = 0.001). In other words, the presence of incentives
mitigated both the condemnation of harmful choices and the
praiseworthiness of helpful choices. However, praiseworthinessPlease cite this article in press as: Siegel, J. Z., et al. Inferences about moral char
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.004judgments were not influenced by profit magnitude in Study 2
(b3+ = 0.023 ± 0.044, t = 0.517, p = 0.606). Finally, consistent with
the analysis described in Fig. 3a and b and work on the omission
bias, our linear model showed that harmful actions were judged
as more blameworthy than harmful inactions (Study 1,
b4 = 0.060 ± 0.007, t = 8.584, p < 0.001; Study 2,
b4 = 0.046 ± 0.011, t = 4.048, p < 0.001), whereas helpful
actions were judged to be more praiseworthy than helpful inac-
tions (Study 1, b4+ = 0.065 ± 0.008, t = 7.888, p < 0.001; Study 2,
b4+ = 0.057 ± 0.016, t = 3.543, p < 0.001).
We next investigated the influence of moral character on par-
ticipants’ sensitivity to consequences for harmful and helpful
choices separately. The interaction of character with shocks was
significant for both harmful choices (Study 1, b5 = 0.011 ± 0.003,
t = 3.998, p < 0.001; Study 2, b5 = 0.023 ± 0.006, t = 3.884,
p < 0.001) and helpful choices (Study 1, b5+ = 0.012 ± 0.002,
t = 5.870, p < 0.001; Study 2, b5+ = 0.024 ± 0.004, t = 5.866,
p < 0.001; Fig. 6a). For both harmful and helpful choices, judg-
ments of bad agents were more sensitive to the magnitude of
shocks than judgments of good agents. In other words, inferring
bad character amplified the effects of increasingly harmful out-
comes on blame and also amplified the effects of increasinglyacter moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise. Cognition
Fig. 5. Character moderates the effects of consequences on moral judgment. Judgments of bad agents’ choices were more sensitive to the magnitude of shocks (A) and the
magnitude of money (B) than judgments of good agents’ choices. Judgments of good and bad agents’ choices were similarly sensitive to the causal role the agents had in
bringing about the consequences. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. Figures illustrate which interactions were statistically significant in Eq. (2). Y-axis
represents the magnitude of the effect on moral judgment. A.u. = arbitrary units, ***P < 0.001; n.s. = not significant.
8 J.Z. Siegel et al. / Cognition xxx (2017) xxx–xxxhelpful outcomes on praise. Character also impacted participants’
sensitivity to money, although these effects were less consistent
across harmful and helpful choices. For harmful choices, the mag-
nitude of profit was weighted more strongly in judgments of bad
agents than good agents (Study 1, b6 = 0.021 ± 0.002,
t = 9.772, p < 0.001; Study 2, b6 = 0.033 ± 0.004, t = 8.646,
p < 0.001). In other words, the presence of personal incentives mit-Please cite this article in press as: Siegel, J. Z., et al. Inferences about moral char
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.004igated blameworthiness judgments of harmful choices made by
bad agents more strongly than was the case for good agents.
However for helpful choices, the magnitude of costs was
weighted marginally stronger in judgments of bad agents’ choices
than good agents in Study 1 (b6+ = 0.030 ± 0.016, t = 1.841,
p = 0.066), but not Study 2 (b6+ = 0.042 ± 0.044, t = 0.974,
p = 0.330; Fig. 6b).acter moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise. Cognition
Fig. 6. Consequences moderate moral judgments of harmful and helpful actions. Moral judgments were more sensitive to the magnitude of shocks (A) and money (B) for bad
agents’ harmful and helpful choices, than good agents. Figures illustrate which interactions were statistically significant in Eq. (3). Parameter estimates are displayed on the y-
axis A.u. = arbitrary units. ***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01; n.s. = not significant, n.s.t. = non-significant trend.
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A person-centered perspective suggests moral judgments
encompass evaluation of an agent’s character, in addition to evalu-
ation of choice behavior itself (Uhlmann et al., 2015). In the present
study we investigated whether inferences about moral character
shape the relative weights placed upon an agent’s consequences
and the degree of imputed causation in attributions of blame and
praise. To do this we employed a novel approach that involved
modelling independent effects of consequences and causation on
moral judgments, during observation of decision sequences made
by ‘bad’ and ‘good’ agents. Each decision involved a trade-off
between personal profit and pain to a victim, and could result from
either actions or inactions. By linking agents to a range of harmful
and helpful outcomes, that varied in their costs and benefits, we
could evaluate how consequences affected judgments of blame
and praise (Malle, 2011; Malle et al., 2014). By framing responses
as either action or inaction, we could also assess the extent to
which an agent’s causal role in bringing about an outcome influ-
enced participants’ blame and praise judgments (Cushman &
Young, 2011; Kordes-de Vaal, 1996; Spranca et al., 1991).
We found that inferences about moral character affected the
influence of consequences on moral judgments. Consequences
were weighted more heavily in judgments of choices made by
bad agents, relative to good agents. In other words, the degree of
harm and the degree of personal profit resulting from the agent’s
choice were more potent factors in blame and praise assessments
of bad agents than was the case for good agents. We also foundPlease cite this article in press as: Siegel, J. Z., et al. Inferences about moral char
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.004that although judgments were sensitive to whether agents caused
the outcomes via an overt action, or via inaction, this factor was
not moderated by the character of the agent. That is, causation
was similarly weighted when making judgments of good and bad
agents’ choices. We note that examining judgments of events
caused by actions versus inactions is just one way to study the
impact of causal attributions on blame and praise. Other possible
approaches include contrasting events caused with physical con-
tact versus no contact, events caused directly versus indirectly,
and events caused as a means versus a side-effect (Cushman &
Young, 2011; Sloman, Fernbach, & Ewing, 2009). Future studies
should test the potential importance of character on causation
using different manipulations to investigate the generalizability
of our findings across multiple manipulations of causation.
In an exploratory analysis, we found that judgments were more
sensitive to the magnitude of shocks not only for bad agents’ harm-
ful choices, but also for their helpful choices. Our findings raise a
question as to why participant’s praiseworthiness judgments were
especially attuned to the helpful consequences of bad agents.
Given that bad agents have historically made self-serving deci-
sions, the more intuitive response might be to mitigate sensitivity
to the magnitude of helping and consider their apparently ‘altruis-
tic’ behavior as driven by situational factors (e.g., low personal cost
to help; Batson & Powell, 2003; Newman & Cain, 2014). From a
strict mental state attribution perspective, this finding is perhaps
puzzling. However, an important aspect of our experimental
design is that no a priori information was provided to participants
about the morality of the agents. Instead, if participants were moti-acter moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise. Cognition
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information across trials to infer on how averse agents were to
harming the victim (i.e., how much each agent was willing to
pay to avoid increases in shocks). One possibility is that partici-
pants were especially motivated to build accurate predictive mod-
els of bad agents, relative to good, because avoiding those whomay
harm us is an important survival instinct (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992;
Johnson, Blumstein, Fowler, & Haselton, 2013). If participants were
highly motivated to build a richer model of bad agents, then we
would not expect them to neglect relevant information provided
in helpful trials. Because people should be particularly motivated
to learn about potential social threats, then they should be more
attuned to all the choices threatening agents make.
Our analysis indicated that harmful choices were less blame-
worthy when accompanied by larger profits, replicating previous
work showing that observers assign less blame to moral violations
resulting in large, relative to small, personal benefits (Xie, Yu, Zhou,
Sedikides, & Vohs, 2014). Furthermore, this effect was more pro-
nounced for bad agents than good agents. That is, the presence of
personal incentives (i.e., money) mitigated blameworthiness judg-
ments of harmful choices made by bad agents more strongly than
was the case for good agents. Meanwhile, we obtained less consis-
tent findings for the effect of personal incentives on judgments of
helpful choices across Studies 1 and 2. First, the presence of incen-
tives mitigated the praiseworthiness of helpful choices in Study 1,
but not Study 2. Second, judgments of bad agents’ choices were
marginally more sensitive to the magnitude of incentives for help-
ful choices in Study 1, but not Study 2. Thus, it is possible that char-
acter only moderates the effect of personal incentives on the
blameworthiness of harmful choices, and not the praiseworthiness
of helpful choices. However, we caution that the range in the mag-
nitude of incentives for helpful choices was very small for bad
agents (as the maximum amount of money bad agents would give
up to help was £1.00; Supplementary Table S3). Furthermore, other
work has shown that agents who help others, in the absence of per-
sonal incentives, are judged more favorably than those whose
helpful choices can be explained by incentives (Newman & Cain,
2014). Thus, an alternative possibility is that the range in money
for helpful choices was too small to observe (a) a main effect of
money for helping in Study 2, and (b) an interaction between char-
acter and money for helping.
Another limitation of our experimental design is that conse-
quences were not dissociated from the intentions of the agents.
Thus, it is unclear whether greater sensitivity to consequences
for bad, relative to good, agents is driven by an increased sensitiv-
ity to intent or consequences. Future studies could dissociate
intent and consequences using the current experimental design
by randomly varying whether the agents’ intentions are actually
implemented. We might speculate that the findings here are moti-
vated by consequences rather than intentions in light of recent
work on how people blame and punish accidents, which dissociate
consequences and intent (Cushman et al., 2009). Research on judg-
ing accidents shows that moral judgments are sensitive to both
consequences and intent (Ahram et al., 2015; Cushman, 2008;
Cushman et al., 2009; Martin & Cushman, 2015; Oswald et al.,
2005), but consequences may play a more dominant role when
judging accidents (Cushman et al., 2009). Notably, sensitivity to
accidental consequences appear to matter significantly more when
people are asked how much blame or punishments should be
attributed to the behavior, than when asked how wrong or permis-
sible it was (Cushman, 2008). Martin and Cushman explain this
finding by arguing that punitive behaviors signal to others to
adjust their actions (Martin & Cushman, 2015; Martin &
Cushman, 2016). In this sense, punishment is adaptive to the
extent that it improves one’s own chance of engaging in futurePlease cite this article in press as: Siegel, J. Z., et al. Inferences about moral char
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.004cooperation with past wrongdoers, and thus serves as a ‘teaching
signal’. If punishment and reward serve as teaching signals, we
might expect them to be more readily endorsed as a function of
outcome severity when we infer bad character. That is, teaching
signals should be preferentially directed towards those who need
to be taught. While we do need to teach someone with a history
of bad behavior right from wrong, this is less necessary when we
consider someone who has already learned how to cooperate.5. Conclusion
We employed novel methods to investigate the effects of moral
character on how people integrate information about conse-
quences and causation in judgments of choices to help or harm a
victim. We validated these methods by replicating previous find-
ings that the magnitude of consequences and causation shape
attributions of blame for harmful choices and praise for helpful
choices. Character moderated the effects of consequences on judg-
ments, with consequences weighting more strongly in judgments
of bad relative to good agents. Our findings support a person-
centered approach to moral judgment, and suggest avenues for
future research investigating how impressions of morality are
formed over time and how these evolving impressions shape sub-
sequent moral judgments.
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